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Judicial Independence and the Budget: A Taxonomy of Judicial Budgeting Mechanisms 
ALEX ROSSELLI* 
ABSTRACT 
This Paper addresses three aspects of judicial budgeting. First, it will identify the 
four broad families of constitutional provisions that consider the judicial budget. 
While the majority of procedures and requirements that govern judicial budgeting 
are found in statues, many nations’ constitutions explicitly address judicial 
salaries. Other constitutions only broadly address judicial budgeting. Second, we 
will analyze different approaches to judicial councils. Third, this Paper will 
address several different approaches to the judicial budgeting process. This 
includes how the judiciary’s budget is proposed, as well as how it is allocated and 
managed. Finally, this Paper will touch upon the tension inherent in judicial 
budgeting in democratic societies. While judicial independence is prioritized by 
most nations, there is a competing priority of ensuring efficient use of public funds. 
This tension can create problems as nations work to keep government spending in 
check, while continuing to honor judicial independence. 
 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO JUDICIAL BUDGETING 
Of the more than seventy nations whose constitutions include some provision relating to 
the judicial budget, four general families emerge to describe the different approaches to judicial 
budgeting. 
A. Model 1: Protection of Judicial Salaries 
 
 The constitutions that fall under this model only provide explicit protection for judicial 
salaries.  Article III, Section I of the United States Constitution offers a good example of this first 
family of constitutional provisions: 
 The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. 
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during 
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a 
Compensation, which  shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.1 
 
* Juris Doctor, 2019, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; Bachelor of Arts, 2010, Macalester College. 
1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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B. Model 2: Independent Judicial Budget 
 
 The second family of constitutional provisions require the judiciary shall have an 
independent budget, and in some instances provide that they shall be able to administer these 
budgets independently. Bolivia offers a good example of this type of provision: “The guarantees 
of judicial independence are . . . [t]he budgetary autonomy of the judicial bodies.”2 
C. Model 3: Salaries Set by Statute 
 The third family of provisions include those that state simply that judicial salaries shall be 
set by statute. Greece provides a good example: “The remuneration of magistrates shall be 
commensurate with their office. Matters concerning their rank, remuneration and their general 
status shall be regulated by special statutes.”3 
D. Model 4: Judicial Budget as Percentage of GDP 
 
 The final family includes only two nations: Nicaragua and Honduras. These two 
constitutions require that the judiciary receive a set percentage of the national budget. Nicaragua’s 
constitution requires that “The Judicial Power shall receive no less than four percent of the General 
Budget of the Republic . . . .”4 Honduras’s constitution states that not only does the judiciary enjoy 
administrative and financial independence, but it also includes the following provision: “In the 
General Budget of Revenues and Expenditures of the Republic it shall have an annual allocation 
of no less than three percent of the current revenues.”5 
 
2 BOLIVIA CONST. tit. III, ch. 1, art. 178. 
3 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 88 (Greece). 
4 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE NICARAGUA [CN.] tit. VIII, ch. V, art. 159., LA GACETA, DIARIO 
OFICIAL [L.G.] 9 January 1987, as amended 2014. 
5 HONDURAS CONST. tit. V, ch. 12, art. 318. 
3 
 
II. JUDICIAL COUNCILS 
 Judicial councils seem to be the most common approach to judicial budgeting. They serve 
as intermediaries between the judiciary and the government, helping to preserve the judiciary’s 
independence.6 The judicial council plays a critical role in the budget process in several northern 
European nations, as well as the United States. 
 While judicial councils have different responsibilities in each country, Wim Voermans 
suggests that there are two models of European judicial councils. The Southern European model 
is “mostly constitutionally rooted and fulfil[s] some primary functions in the safeguarding of 
judicial independence. These functions typically include advice as regards the appointment or 
promotion of members of the judiciary, or the exercise of the power of appointment of promotion 
by the Council itself, the training and the exercise of disciplinary powers with regard to members 
of the judiciary.”7 
 In contrast, the Northern European model includes councils that are primarily involved 
with court administration, court management, and the budgeting of courts.8 This includes setting 
the budget, distribution and allocation, and the supervision and control of the expenditures.9 The 
United States falls into this category. Most of these councils are very similar, although there are 
some notable differences. 
One of the main factors that influences how effective a judicial council is in terms of 
ensuring judicial independence is the council’s composition. There are numerous approaches to 
designing a judicial council. These councils can be as small as only four members, in the case of 
 
6 Wim Voermans, Councils for the Judiciary in Europe: Trends and Models, in THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION IN THE 
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 2133 (Fransisco Fernandez Segado ed., 2003). 
7 Id. at 2. 
8 Id. at 2–3. 
9 Id. at 3. 
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the Netherlands, to as many as forty-four, in the case of Belgium.10 Analyzing council membership 
models can be split into two stages: how members join the council, and who the members are. 
A. How Members are Selected 
 
Regarding the process for selecting members of the council, members join the council 
either through appointment, election, or a combination. 
1. Only Elected by Their Peers 
 
In this approach, judges vote or otherwise select individuals from among their profession 
to serve on the council. In Hungary, the fourteen member judges are selected according to a 
majority vote among judges.11 
2. Elected by Peers and Selected by Executive or Legislative Branches 
The second model of judicial councils is made up of judges and individuals selected by one 
of the other two branches of government. Slovenia and Italy include lawyers and law professors 
elected by the Parliament.12 In France, the President of the Republic, the National Assembly, and 
the Senate each appoints two citizens who are not members of either the Parliament or the 
judiciary.13 In Romania, the Senate elects two representatives from civil society.14 
Lebanon also falls into this category. Prior to 2001, all ten members of the Higher Judiciary 
Council were appointed by the Executive.15 Reform No. 389 of 21 December 2001 introduced the 
idea of electing members to the Council by the judiciary body, although there are only two elected 
 
10 Primož Rataj & Gerga Strban, Supreme Courts as Guarantees for Effectiveness of Judicial Systems in the European 
Union, in BEST PRACTICE GUIDE FOR MANAGING SUPREME COURTS 102 (2017). 
11 Id. at 103 n.275. 
12 Id. at 103. 
13 Id. at 108 n.337. 
14 Id. at 108 n.335. 
15 INT’L FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, JUDICIAL COUNCILS REFORMS FOR AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: 
EXAMPLES FROM EGYPT, JORDAN, LEBANON, MOROCCO, AND PALESTINE 13 (2009). 
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members.16 The three established members of the Council include the President of the Court of 
Cassation who is the President of the Council, the Attorney General to the Court of Cassation, and 
the President of the Judicial Inspection Committee, all of whom are appointed by a decree of the 
Council of Ministers. The remaining members are judges appointed by decree, upon proposals 
from the minister of justice.17 
3. Elected by Peers and Selected by a Non-Governmental Body 
The third model includes judges and non-judge members, but the non-judge members are 
selected by a non-governmental body. In Bulgaria, prosecutors elect four members of the 
Council.18 In Estonia, the bar association appoints a member to the Council.19 
B. Qualifications for Membership 
 Regarding whom may serve on the Judicial Council, there are four models. 
1. Judges-Only 
The first model includes only judges on the judicial council. Among EU member states 
that have a judicial council (twenty-one in total), only four include only judges: Hungary, 
Lithuania, Northern Ireland, and Scotland.  The United States falls into this category. The Chief 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court presides over the conference, and the rest of the 
membership is comprised of the chief judge of each judicial circuit, the Chief Judge of the Court 
of International Trade, as well as a district judge from each regional judicial circuit.20 
 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Rataj & Strban, supra note 10, at 104. 
19 Id. at 109. 
20 Julia S. Gibbons, How the Judiciary Gets its Funding, FED. LAW., Oct. 2009, at 31. 
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Hungary provides a unique twist on the judges-only model. While the Council is comprised 
of only judges, there are several non-judges who can attend Council meetings and are given 
consultation rights. The list of individuals who may attend includes: the President of the National 
Office for the Judiciary, the Minister of Justice, the Prosecutor General, the President of the 
Hungarian Bar Association, the President of the Hungarian Chamber of Notaries Public and any 
ad-hoc experts and the representatives of any civil society organizations and other interest groups 
invited.21 
2. Judges and Other Individuals Appointed by Another Branch of Government 
 
The second model of judicial councils is made up of a mixed membership, including judges 
and individuals selected by one of the other two branches of government. Slovenia and Italy 
include lawyers and law professors elected by the Parliament.22 
3. Judges and Other Individuals Appointed by Non-Governmental Groups 
The third model is also a mixed membership, but the non-judge members are individuals 
who represent non-governmental interests or groups. These non-judge members can include legal 
professionals, an individual appointed by the bar association, and representatives of users of the 
courts. In Bulgaria, for example, prosecutors elect four members of the Council.23 
4. Judges, Other Individuals, and Members of the Other Branches 
The fourth model includes judges, other individuals, as well as members of the executive 
or legislative branches. In Jordan, the Judicial Council is composed of a president, who is 
appointed by the King, the president of the Supreme Administrative Court, chief prosecutor at the 
 
21 Rataj & Strban, supra note 10, at 103 n.75. 
22 Id. at 103. 
23 Id. at 104. 
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Court of Cassation, a judge from the Court of Cassation, presidents of the courts of appeal, 
secretary general of the Ministry of Justice, president of the Amman-based Court of First Instance 
and two heads of courts of first instance from governorates other than the capital.24 
In Estonia, for example, the judicial council includes the following individuals: members 
of the Parliament, a sworn advocate appointed by the Board of the Bar Association, the Chief 
Public Prosecutor or a prosecutor appointed by the Chief Public Prosecutor, and the Chancellor of 
Justice or a representative appointed by the Chancellor, while the minister of justice is a participant 
with the right to speak.25 
In these mixed councils, a balance is struck between ensuring the judiciary has a voice in 
any relevant discussions, but also ensuring that the judiciary is not able to completely control their 
own governance. Of course, this can be a double-edged sword; if the non-judge members are 
merely tools of the executive or legislative branches, then the autonomy of the body is threatened.26 
There is extreme diversity in the different positions and individuals represented in mixed councils. 
Mixed councils include members of parliament (Estonia),27 the minister of justice (Poland),28 and 
the attorney general (Palestine).29 
III. METHODS OF JUDICIAL BUDGETING 
This section will walk through the process by which the judiciary proposes and receives 
funds, as well as how the funds are managed. In order to see where the pressure points may emerge, 
the process can be broken down into five stages, and various approaches to each stage will be 
 
24 Senate Approves Changes to Judiciary Independence Law, JORDAN TIMES (Last updated July 31, 2017), 
http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/senate-approves-changes-judiciary-independence-law. 
25 Rataj & Strban, supra note 10, at 104. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, JUDICIAL COUNCILS REFORMS FOR AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: 
EXAMPLES FROM EGYPT, JORDAN, LEBANON, MOROCCO, AND PALESTINE 17 (2009). 
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addressed in turn. First, we will look at the where the funds for the judiciary come from. Second, 
we will consider the budget proposal process, including who negotiates the budget and how. Third, 
we will look at how the funds are allocated, including whether the funds are earmarked for 
particular expenses or if it comes in a lump sum. Fourth, we will identify who actually doles out 
the funds. Fifth, we will look at how the judiciary handles accounting and auditing processes. 
Finally, we will consider how the judiciary may be held accountable for its use of funds. By 
breaking down the process into these stages, we can see where along the process independence 
may break down or be protected. 
A. Source of Funds 
 Judicial funds derive from two buckets of money: state funds and state funds plus other 
sources. 
1. Exclusively State Funds 
 In this model, the judiciary’s budget is derived exclusively from state funds. In Denmark, 
for example, the state central budget finances the judiciary entirely, and any fees that are generated 
are sent to the Ministry of Justice; these fees do not impact the judiciary’s budget.30 
2. State Funds Plus Other Sources 
In this model, the state’s central budget is supplemented by any revenue from other sources. 
In Egypt, the budget is made up of court fees, fines paid in civil and criminal cases, any goods 
confiscated by the courts, as well as resources allocated by the state in the public budget.31 The 
 
30 EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY (ENCJ), FUNDING THE JUDICIARY: PREPARATORY WORK, 
QUESTIONNAIRE AND REPLIES 86 ANNEX II TO THE ENCJ REPORT (2015–2016).  
31 Mahmud al-Khudayri, The Law on Judicial Authority and Judicial Independence, in JUDGES AND POLITICAL 
REFORM IN EGYPT 45, 55 (Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron ed., 2008). 
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UK Supreme Court adds another category of funds. That court is funded by general state funds, 
court fees, contributions from the Northern Ireland Court Service and the Scottish government, 
and a small line item derived from the gift shop and renting the venue out.32 
IV. BUDGET REQUEST AND NEGOTIATION 
A. Pre-Budget Negotiation: Budget Framework Established 
 
This is not the process for every country, but before budget negotiations and planning 
begins in some nations, the Ministry of Finance or appropriate ministry will establish budget 
frameworks for every ministry. These frameworks include guidelines applicable to each ministry 
for them to follow when they draw up their respective budget proposals, and usually reflect policy 
priorities or overall budgetary realities. Based on these guidelines, each court or council will draft 
their budgets and submit it to the appropriate body. 
In Albania, for example, once the Ministry of Finance issues the overall guidelines, the 
Office for the Administration of the Judicial Budget (ZABGJ), which oversees the administration 
of the courts’ budgets, directs the individual courts to propose their budgets in accordance with the 
guidelines.33 
Once the framework has been established, the first stage of the budget process is the initial 
request for funding, which is often accompanied by an ongoing negotiation between various 
entities. There is some degree of variety in which entities are involved in making the initial 
proposal, as well as who has a seat at the negotiating table once the proposal is made. At the most 
basic level, the first question is how the authority to draw up the budget is split between the 
Executive and the Courts. 
 
32 GRAHAM GEE ET AL., THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE UK'S CHANGING CONSTITUTION 205–06 
(2015). 
33 EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY, supra note 30, at 38.  
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B. Complete Executive Control 
 
Under the Executive model, the authority to draw up the budget lies with either the minister 
of justice or the minister of finance; the judiciary is shut out of the process entirely. In Belgium, 
for example, the minister of justice, in accordance with the budgetary framework established by 
the Government, draws up the budget and submits it to the Council of Ministers and the minister 
of finance.34 
C. Court Proposes the Budget and Negotiates with the Executive Before Budget is Submitted to 
the Legislature 
 
 This is the more common approach for proposing the budget. In accordance with overall 
budget guidelines established for each ministry, the Court develops a budget to then propose to the 
Executive, usually the Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of Finance. Often the MOJ will send the 
budgetary guidelines to the courts, who then propose their individual budget requests to the MOJ. 
Denmark presents an interesting example of this process, even though they do not have to 
follow it. The Court Administration receives the budget guidelines from the Ministry of Justice.35 
It then negotiates a budget with the Ministries of Finance and Justice; once that budget is approved, 
the Ministry of Finance submits it to the Parliament as a part of the overall Finance Bill. However, 
because the Court Administration is an independent institution, it has the legal authority to present 
its own budget directly to Parliament, but the Administration has never actually used this 
authority.36 
 
 
34 Id. at 44. 
35 Id. at 38. 
36 Id. 
11 
 
D. Court Proposes the Budget to the Executive, but Retains Right to Negotiate with the 
Legislature 
 
In one model, the judiciary submits a budget request to a member of the Government, 
usually the minister of justice, who then submits that proposal to Parliament. Once the budget is 
proposed, the Executive negotiates with Parliament on each line item. However, the judiciary 
retains the authority to negotiate or submit commentary according to how the negotiations proceed. 
The United Kingdom’s Supreme Court provides one example of what this process looks 
like. The President of the Supreme Court and the Chief Executive of the Court determine the 
request for funding, and they present the request to the Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor 
includes that request as a separate line item on the MOJ’s budgetary request to the Treasury. In 
this process, the Lord Chancellor is simply a conduit for the Court’s budgetary request; no changes 
to the Court’s request are to be made.37 Ultimately, the Lord Chancellor is responsible for working 
directly with the Treasury to secure funds for the Court. This can pose a problem for ensuring the 
judiciary’s funding is truly protected. To address this clear deficiency in the judiciary’s ability to 
negotiate its own budget, a concordat was reached in 2013 between the MOJ and Supreme Court. 
This agreement laid out that the Lord Chancellor will submit to the Treasury without amendment 
whatever request for funding is received from the Court. However, the Lord Chancellor retains the 
right to include any additional comments as to the merits of the bid. Additionally, while the Lord 
Chancellor works directly with the Treasury to secure the Court’s funds, the Court is not prevented 
from also negotiating with the Treasury.38 Next, the Chief Executive of the Supreme Court submits 
 
37 GEE ET AL., supra note 32, at 206. 
38 Concordat Between the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, Sec. 5 (Oct. 2013). 
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an estimate to the Treasury to then be presented to the Parliament as a part of the overall 
estimates.39 
In the United States, the funds for the judicial branch are included annually in the Financial 
Services and General Government (FSGG) Appropriations bill.40 The Supreme Court’s budget is 
split into two accounts: (1) Salaries and Expenses; and (2) Care of the Buildings and Grounds.41 
The judiciary’s budget is proposed by the Judicial Conference of the United States, which is the 
national policy-making body for the federal courts .42 The budgeting process begins a year and a 
half before the start of the next fiscal year when the chair of the Conference’s Budget Committee 
sends a budget guidance letter to the chairs of the nine Judicial Conference committees with 
financial responsibilities.43 Each committee is then responsible for developing the budget request 
for its area of responsibility, and these requests are then presented to the Budget Committee.44 The 
Budget Committee then considers each request and presents a budget recommendation the Judicial 
Conference, which then approves the full budget request.45 By statute, the budget is then presented 
to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the President present the judiciary’s budget 
with the full budget request to Congress.46 Following the official submission of the budget to the 
 
39 Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, (Eng.), Staff and Resources ¶ 184, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/4/notes/division/6/6/8. 
40 Matthew E. Glassman, Judiciary Appropriations FY 2017, CONG. RES. SERV., May 15, 2017, Summary, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44526.pdf 
41 Voermans, supra note 6, at 7 
42 Gibbons, supra note 20, at 31. 
43 Id. at 30. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 31 U.S.C. § 1105(b) – Budget Contents and Submission to Congress: “Estimated expenditures and proposed 
appropriations for the legislative branch and the judicial branch to be included in each budget under subsection (a)(5) 
of this section shall be submitted to the President before October 16 of each year and included in the budget by the 
President without change.” It should be noted that the President is authorized to submit deficiency and supplemental 
appropriations if necessary because of laws enacted after the submission of the budget. The President is required to 
include reasons for the submissions, as well as justification for why the supplemental request was not made in the 
original budget. Both the legislative and judicial branches also have the authority to propose deficiency and 
supplemental appropriations, which the President must promptly transmit to Congress without change. See 31 U.S.C. 
§ 1107. 
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OMB, members of the Judicial Conference’s Administrative Office present a more detailed budget 
to Congress, and Administrative Office staff members work with members of the Financial 
Services and General Government Appropriations Subcommittee to highlight budget requests.47 
Sweden’s budgeting cycle lasts three years. During the first year, the Council presents a 
proposed budget to the Government on March 1.48 The Government includes that proposal in its 
overall budget proposal to Parliament on September 20.49 Between March 1 and September 20, 
the Government and the Council negotiate policy objectives and other measurements which are 
then included in the instructions from the Government to the Council once the budget is finally 
approved.50 After the Government submits the budget to Parliament, both bodies will refer to past 
annual reports prepared by the Council for guidance on funding decisions.51 
Denmark has a similar request process to Sweden. The Domstolsstyrelsen submits the 
budget proposal to the minister of justice, who then submits the proposal to Parliament. Even 
though the Domstolsstyrelsen makes budget proposals to the minister of justice, it retains the 
authority to address Parliament directly if it considers the allocated funds to be insufficient. 52  
E. Council Offers an Opinion About the Budget 
 
 In countries where the council or judiciary lacks a formal seat at the budgeting drafting or 
negotiating table, those bodies can still submit an opinion about the budget request. In the 
Netherlands, the Council provides an opinion on the formal budget proposal drafted by the 
Ministry of Security and Justice, who proposes the bill the Parliament.53  
 
47 Gibbons, supra note 20, at 30. 
48 WIM VOERMANS & PIM ALBERS, COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY IN EU COUNTRIES 24. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Voermans, supra note 6, at 5. 
53 BEST PRACTICE GUIDE FOR MANAGING SUPREME COURTS, supra note 10, at 119 n.464. 
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V. BUDGET ALLOCATION 
 Once the budget is approved, the next step in the process is the allocation of funds.  There 
are two ways budgets are allocated: earmarked allocation and lump sum allocation. In either 
instance, when funds are allocated to individual courts, the funds tend to be allocated according to 
a variety of factors, including court performance. 
A. Legislative Earmarks 
 
 Under this approach, the budget allocated by Parliament is earmarked for specific 
expenditures. In Denmark, a certain percentage of the funds are allocated to the courts directly, 
while the remaining allocation is sent to the Court Administration for expenses including training, 
specific projects, technology, and buildings.54 
When funds are allocated to individual courts, a variety of factors are considered, 
including: caseload (England and Wales),55 the previous year’s budget (France),56 and even just 
contact between the head of the individual courts who can draw attention to the needs of their court 
(Italy).57 
Performance budgeting, the process of tying budget allocation to performance, is a 
controversial approach to ensuring democratic accountability over the judiciary. Estonia, the 
Netherlands, and France are some of the countries who are currently using some performance 
budgeting approaches.58 The criteria used to determine budget allocation is set by different bodies 
 
54 EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY, supra note 30, at 97. 
55 Id. at 102. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 103. 
58 Id. at 99–102. 
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in different countries, these include: the Ministry of Finance (Croatia),59 the Parliament (Spain),60 
the Judicial Council (Lithuania),61 as well as set forth in the law.62 
B. Lump Sum, No Earmarks 
In this model, funds are allocated to the judiciary without any direction from the legislature. 
It is up to the judiciary to spend the funds according to its own discretion. In Sweden, once the 
judicial budget is approved by Parliament, the Council receives a lump sum without any 
earmarks.63 The Council then determines each court’s budget and distribution based on four 
criteria: (1) type of court; (2) size of court; (3) case load; and (4) special circumstances that may 
require supplemental funds.64 When Parliament passes the budget, it includes general instructions 
that relate to how budget targets should be achieved.65  
In the United States, once Congress approves the judiciary’s budget, the Executive 
Committee of the Judicial Conference establishes a spending plan for the entire judiciary, and the 
Administrative Office allocates funding to each court based on this spending plan.66 
VI. BUDGET ADMINISTRATION 
 Budget administration involves determining how the budget should be handled within the 
amount allocated. The different approaches to budget administration can be categorized into three 
categories: administrative authority vested in the Executive, authority vested in the Council or 
courts, and authority that is divided between the two. Judicial budget administration exemplifies 
 
59 Id. at 107. 
60 Id. at 109. 
61 Id. at 108. 
62 Id. 
63 VOERMANS & ALBERS, supra note 48, at 25. 
64 Id. at 24. 
65 Id. at 21. 
66 Gibbons, supra note 20, at 31. 
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the tension inherent in the judicial budgeting process. There is a constant balance to be struck 
between judicial independence on the one hand, and democratic accountability on the other. 
A. Administrative Authority in the Executive 
 
 Under this approach, the budget for the judiciary is administered by one of the ministries 
in the executive branch. Generally, this authority falls to the minister of justice. In France the 
minister of justice has the authority to administer funds, and the ministry of justice determines how 
much each individual court receives from the total amount allocated.67 Similarly, in Australia the 
High Court of Australia Act of 1979 granted the High Court the legal recognition to administer its 
own affairs.68 The act further set out that the High Court would receive funds based on an 
appropriation from parliament.69 However, the minister of justice “may give directions as to the 
amounts in which, and the times at which, moneys [appropriated by parliament] are to be paid to 
the court.”70 The court may not spend money in a way not in accordance with what the Minister 
approved. 
B. Administrative Authority in the Council or Courts 
 
 Under this approach, the authority to administer the funds for the judiciary devolves to the 
individual courts, or more often, the council. This seems to be the far more common approach.  
Indeed, most European nations utilize this approach. In Poland the First President of the Supreme 
Court is authorized to administer the budget for the Court.71  
 
67 EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY, supra note 30, at 92. 
68 High Court of Australia Act of 1979, (Cth) pt. III, § 17. 
69 High Court of Australia Act of 1979, (Cth) pt. V, § 35, div. 1. 
70 High Court of Australia Act of 1979, (Cth) pt. V, § 35, div. 2. 
71 EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY, supra note 30, at 94. 
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In the United States the judiciary is unique among federal government agencies in that 
funding is distributed and managed by the courts in decentralized manner.72 Once the funds are 
dispersed to the lower courts, the chief judge of that court and the court unit’s executives are free 
to use those funds as they see fit.73 There are several advantages to this flexible approach to judicial 
expenditures. Resource allocation and staffing needs can be taken care of at the local level, which 
can help ensure a more responsive and efficient use of funds.74 Additionally court units within a 
judicial district can move funds among different units, which can help local courts address needs 
more efficiently than if they were to rely on the Administrative Office.75 
C. Divided Administrative Authority 
 
 There are only a few examples of this approach, and the division of authority seems to fall 
according to use of funds. In Croatia, for example, the court president decides on the administration 
within the funds allocated to that court. The MOJ decides how to administer capital investments 
funds.76 In England and Wales, the authority initially lies with the Board of HM Courts and 
Tribunals Service. The Board only acts unanimously, so if the members are unable to resolve a 
dispute regarding, among other things, how to administer funds, the Lord Chancellor and the Lord 
Chief Justice jointly work to resolve the matter. This contingency has never occurred.77 
VII. ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING PROCESS 
The primary approach to accounting and auditing is to vest this authority with the courts 
or Council. A second approach gives the Executive the authority to audit the judiciary. 
 
72 Gibbons, supra note 20, at 31. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 31. 
75 Id. 
76 EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY, supra note 30, at 91. 
77 Id. 
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A. Authority in the Council or Judiciary 
 
In this model, the responsibility of tracking expenditures falls to the judiciary. For example, 
the U.K. Supreme Court’s Chief Executive is responsible for keeping track of the courts 
accounting.78 Sweden’s Domstolsverket maintains a system of financial accountability over the 
lower courts, although there are no real sanctions for exceeding a budget allocation.79 
B. Executive Authority 
 
There are some countries where the Executive supervises the judiciary though direct 
inquiries of the judiciary. In France, every three months, the appeals courts provide the Ministry 
of Justice with a budget overview, and once a year they provide an annual report justifying the 
expenditures.80 
VIII. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 Political accountability in this context involves the ability of a body outside the judiciary 
to hold the judiciary accountable based on the judiciary’s use of funds. There are three approaches 
to balancing judicial independence against the political accountability for the use of public funds: 
accountability that runs only to the court, weak accountability to the Executive, and a stronger 
accountability to the Executive. 
A. Accountability to the Court Only 
 
The Explanatory Note to the United Kingdom’s Constitution Reform Act of 2005 lays out 
the budgetary process for the Supreme Court, including tracing the contours of political 
 
78 GEE ET AL., supra note 32, at 203. 
79 VOERMANS & ALBERS, supra note 48, at 26. 
80 Id. at 55. 
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accountability. The staff of the Supreme Court will be accountable to the Chief Executive, not the 
Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor leads the MOJ, so the decision to vest managerial control 
over the Supreme Court’s staff in the Chief Executive can be seen as a small, but important move 
to protect the judiciary’s staff from outside influence. Similarly, the Chief Executive is answerable 
to the President of the Supreme Court, not the Lord Chancellor.81 
B. Weak Accountability to the Executive 
 
In a few countries, the Council or courts are only weakly accountable to the executive. In 
Scotland, the Scottish Court Service (SCS), a fully independent board led by judges without any 
ministerial direction, this has created an issue of accountability. The Judiciary and Courts Act of 
2008 provides that ministers may take over the SCS only in the event of a serious failure to perform 
its functions.82 The Chief Executive of the SCS is ultimately responsible for presenting the SCS’s 
accounts to Parliament, and also appears before the Public Audit Committee to give an update on 
the SCS’s work. The Scotland Act of 1998 explicitly prohibits the Scottish Parliament from 
summoning judges, although there was debate during the passage of the Judiciary and Courts Act 
about the propriety for allowing Parliament to summon judicial members of the SCS board; 
Parliament settled for the power to invite judges.83 
C. Strong Accountability to the Executive 
 
In other nations, the Council and the courts are more firmly accountable to the executive. 
In the Netherlands, the Council is fully accountable to the minister of justice regarding how funds 
 
81 GEE ET AL., supra note 32, at 202. 
82 Judiciary and Courts Act of 2008, (ASP 6) pt. 4, Sec. 70 (Scot.). 
83 GEE ET AL., supra note 32, at 234. 
20 
 
are spent.84 Sweden’s approach to ministerial accountability and control has largely dictated the 
nation’s approach to controlling the Domstolsverket. In Sweden ministers are generally only able 
to act, and be held liable, collectively as the Government, rather than independently.85 Moreover, 
ministers are traditionally not responsible for the activities of independent administrative bodies, 
if the activity lies beyond the minister’s power of intervention.86 Control of these bodies lies in 
other mechanisms, including the specific directives and instructions accompanying the budget 
from Parliament.87 Given the lack of ministerial accountability and control over independent 
administrative bodies, Sweden opted to create the Domstolsverket as an intermediary between the 
Government and the judiciary. When the Government wishes to hold the judiciary accountable or 
otherwise question the courts, the Government calls upon the Council.88 
CONCLUSION 
 Each of the above sections can be understood as a decision point. At each point, legislators 
determine which individual or governmental body has the authority to request, approve, or set the 
judiciary’s budget. As such, each decision point can represent further protection of judicial 
independence, or an erosion of the independence of the judiciary. The more control the judiciary 
has over each stage of the budget process, the more independent the judiciary is likely to be. On 
the flip side, if the executive or legislative branches each of the decisions regarding the budget, the 
judiciary can’t be expected to function entirely independently. 
 
84 Rataj & Strban, supra note 10, at 119 n.460. 
85 VOERMANS & ALBERS, supra note 48, at 20. 
86 Id. at 21. 
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